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Economics of Class Actions
George Priest
Actually, I'm just a setup act for Chris Buckley. He is going to be making the
principal presentation on this panel. I'm going to start by talking about some very simple
economic features--I would not even call them principles--but features of class action
litigation which you're all aware of. I have two basic points to make.
Let me lead up to the first one. The economics ofclass actions are pretty simple.
As you all know and everyone knows, class actions serve the purpose of aggregating
common claims. This creates something of an economy of scale, hopefully, whereby a
large number ofclaims can be resolved with, supposedly, greater efficiency and greater
dispatch than resolving each ofthe claims individually. This would be especially true and
it has been true with class actions which involve claims that are small on their face and
that might not justify individual litigation but which, when joined as a class, become
worthwhile to litigate. Although this point is often made, the economy ofscale argument
does not apply only to small claims. There is no reason not to realize economies ofscale
oflarge claims just as ofsmall claims, but oftentimes for reasons we will talk about later,
there are grounds that may caution against aggregating large claims in a class. There are
broader issues with regard to aggregation itself.
As an institution in the civil justice system, the class action has taken on a new life
in the last two decades as standards of liability have expanded, especially given the
inherent uncertainties in the process ofresolution oftrial by jury in the mass tort context.
These are not new points to any of you, but I do want to add one thing in a moment,
especially in the mass tort context. The position ofa defendant in a class action resembles
the position of the Soviet Union after World War II. To our modem sensibility, we
viewed the relationship with the Soviet Union and the United States, as one ofmutually
assured destruction. This is the idea that kept nuclear war away, because both countries
could destroy each other easily.
In the context of a mass tort class action, there is no "mutual" to the assured
destruction. The great economies that are created by bringing together in a class thousands
ofindividual claims, even ifthose individual claims are small, means that there is nothing
mutual about it. There is some expense,
ofcourse, on the part ofthe class attorney
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defendants, there's a very large risk. There is really a nuclear bomb assured destruction
form of risk which leads to a very unusual statistic. This is not a confirmed statistic, but
I haven't seen any exceptions to it and I've been looking for exceptions for some time.
As the stakes of the defendant become greater, the defendant tends to settle out those
cases that the defendant might lose, even possibly might lose. In some context, remember,
in products liability plaintiffs win about forty-two percent ofthe time and in malpractice
they win about thirty-nine percent of the time.
According to common belief.-again, it's very difficult to get statistics of this
nature--there are no mass tort class actions that are ever litigated. They are all settled.
There is no success rate one way or another for plaintiffs or defendants in mass tort class
actions because, once a class action is certified, because of the assured destructive
capability of that class action with regard to, a mass tort context, where we're dealing
typically with substantial damages per class member, the defendants always settle. None
of the cases are ever litigated. There are no records in class actions that are settled. This
is a little different in the context of other forms of consumer class actions and quite
different in the context of civil rights class actions where damages are not at issue. But,
where damages are a substantial issue, the combination ofthe expansion of liability, the
uncertainty of the process, and the way our class action procedures are devised, almost
always leads to automatic settlement or guaranteed settlement once a class action is
certified.
That means that the certification process then becomes the only avenue for a court
to rule in a way that is relevant to the ultimate outcome ofthe case. Does the court certify
the class action or not? This is not exactly an economic point, it's an economic point
along with a procedural point. Our current class action procedures are affected very
substantially by the treatment ofthe class action in the federal rules or in state procedural
rules, as well as a procedural decision unrelated to the substantive merits of the case.
In Rule 23, under the Eisen! case decided by the Supreme Court many years ago,
the basic principle is established that a court should not review the claims in a case on
their substantive merit for purposes of certification. Certification is regarded as a
procedural action only. In all ofthe federal rules and in the state rules ofcivil procedure,
Rule 23 or its analogue appears in the denominated parties section, where the only
question is who are going to be the appropriate parties in the case. The general
proposition is that the substantive merit of the claim should not be subjected to review.
Basically, the Eisen case established the proposition that the class ought not to be
certified, given the other requirements for certification ofa class, just because the claims
of the case have some merit. The converse has been said in many cases, too, that
certification ought not to be denied ifthe various qualifications for class certification are
met even if the merits of the case are weak.
In the context of the economic effect of the aggregation of these claims and the
extraordinary settlement power created by the aggregation ofclaims in a class, we have
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to rethink whether the rule makes sense. I would argue something more. Class action
procedures and the class action case law has developed and flowered in the last fifteen
years. We have seen a development of the analysis of the various requirements for class
action certification. Numerosity is a pretty easy requirement to deal with, but what does
it mean for claims to be common, for the claims of law to be common among members
of the class? How do we evaluate the adequacy of representation by a named class
member or by counsel? How do we evaluate the typicality of the class of the
representative class members' or named class members' claims to those ofthe class? How
do we decide the superiority question? Is the class action a superior way ofbringing the
litigation? Is it manageable?
The first point I want to make is that, over time, we've seen the development of
a definition of commonality and a definition and an evaluation of adequacy of
representation. The definition and evaluation oftypicality, manageability, and superiority
introduce, given the clear procedural nature of those requirements, is a means of
substantive review ofthe class action before certification is granted. That's a good thing,
although I think it should go further. I think given the great hydraulic pressure that is
created by the aggregation ofcases, that it's necessary to evaluate the ultimate merits of
the case as best as possible at the point of certification. If the economic power of the
certification ofthe class is such that, ifcertified, the defendant will settle on some terms,
then it seems to me that it's necessary in order to achieve the goals of justice in our
society, to evaluate the merits ofthe claims as to whether the claims have sufficient merit
on their face without a lot ofdiscovery and to examine whether the claims have sufficient
potential merit to justify the creation ofgreat economic power through class certification.
When we look at many modem class action cases we see some of that going on.
For example, in In re Rhone-Poulenc/ a decision by Chief Judge Richard Posner of the
Seventh Circuit considered an interlocutory appeal of partial class certification. Judge
Posner was considering certificationofa claim brought by individuals who had contracted
the mv virus from a blood transfusion. Posner went through the various requirements,
numerosity, commonality, adequacy, and economic worth. Really, on their face, there's
nothing you can say about these requirements that the plaintiffs didn't meet. It was a
pretty clear claim. There was no contributory negligence defense in any of these claims.
You could argue about whether the damages were individualized, but that's not an
overwhelming complexity to deal with in most class actions. Yet, Posner made the point,
that a lot ofthese cases' claims were already litigated. There had been thirteen trials. The
plaintiffs had lost twelve ofthem. Posner, looking at the fact that in twelve of thirteen of
cases the plaintiffs lost, ordered the decertification ofthe class. I don't think it's a wrong
decision. I think it's probably the right decision, but it has to be viewed as, not a
determinative view but a preliminary view ofthe merits into the certification decision for
purposes of placing some form of judicial and legal control over this great economic
power that is created by certification alone.
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I have one more point about the economics ofclass actions, and this deals with the
administration of class actions. I have served for ten years now as a special master in a
large federal class action in New Jersey. The point I want to make is that, after the class
is certified, and even after there are initial liability decisions, there are very serious
economic agency problems with a court supervising or attempting to supervise the
administration of the class by the class attorneys.
Those of you who have administered class actions will know something of this,
but the economics and the method of dealing with the issues that arise in class action
administration change very dramatically after there is a settlement. With a settlement the
court has to face, through its assistant or special master (if fortunate as a state court
judge), the administration of the settlement and the distribution of the settlement funds.
There are different relationships created between all ofthe parties following a settlement,
and those relationships mean that, it is often the case that administration ofthe remaining
class issues is delegated to the class attorneys who have very complicated arrangements
and relationships with various members ofthe class.. Those various relationships become
different after the settlement occurs, yet it remains the court's responsibility to monitor
the administration of the settlement. As a general matter, it's most typical not to have a
special master, but the special master was appointed in the case in which I was involved
because it was a very complicated liability case. The judge thought the case involved
computers and thought I knew something about computers, but it turned out the case,
once you looked at it, did not involve computers at all. Neither the judge, nor I, nor
anybody else, knew what the case was about until we really got into it.
There is a tendency on the part ofjudges to delegate to the class attorneys the
administration of the settlement. Because of serious agency problems, I believe that
delegation of this nature becomes very problematic from the standpoint of achieving
justice for each member of the class.
Two things happen after a class action is settl~d and the class settlement has to be
administered by attorneys. One is that opposing attorneys disappear. You no longer have
defendants and for the most part, they don't care how the class is administered. They have
settled the case. Once the settlement is approved, they're out, and there is no longer a
counterweight to monitor the plaintiff's attorneys as to what they will do.
Secondly, with regard to the class attorneys there is, in the context of the
administration of a settlement, a change in the underlying normative structure of the
enterprise. The underlying normative structure oflitigation is not finding out what the law
is, achieving justice, and determining whether the claimants deserve to recover and how
much they deserve to recover. Once there is a settlement, those underlying norms change,
in part, because the attorneys don't want any problems, or they want to forget about
problems, or because they are sympathetic to the various parties with whom they deal.
There is a substantial shift from what I might call justice norms to what I call
communitarian norms. In the administration ofa class action, there is a norm of helping
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everybody out, making sure everybody gets something, even those that have the weakest
claims or nonexistent claims. This leads to problems in terms ofachieving those goals and
achieving that justice.
For example, we deal with the notion that we have named plaintiffs or
representative plaintiffs and that the attorneys report to the representative plaintiffs and
the representative plaintiffs make the decisions and sign off on what the attorneys do.
That is a total myth. In the case in which I was involved, the representative plaintiffs were
wonderful people, serious people, tried to keep abreast, but of course they were totally
subject to the information and advice provided to them by the class attorneys. Given all
of the complexity of absent class members, they are less able to make any informed
decision than a litigant in any normal case would be.
In essence, we ought to view this as having been turned over to the class attorneys
and simply accept that fact. Because of these agency problems, and because of the shift
of norms toward the communitarian view, there are many deviations or potential
deviations between what the judge would do if he or she were administering the case
myself versus having a special master administering it.
As another example, there are constant attempts following settlement to strain the
class definition. That occurs prior to the settlement to some extent, because once the
parties are pretty sure they're going to settle, both the plaintiffs and defendants want to
define the class as broadly as possible. The plaintiffs want this because it will help justify
their attorney fee petition; the defendants want the result because it will give them greater
claim preclusion in the future. Even after you have the class definition, the class hearing,
the fairness hearing and the settlement approved, there are constant strains on the class
definition to provide a little money to other people that the class attorneys think ought to
have a little money or would prefer to have money or are disappointed that the dividing
line in the class definition kept them out. It is very difficult to deal with supplicants ofthat
nature after the fact; and, I think, given the very limited attention that a court can give to
what the class attorneys do, we have substantial strains on the definition ofjustice in class
action settlements.
There are many similar strains in the definition ofa class action distribution plan.
Again, my case involved a substantial amount ofmoney, $415 million, so there was a lot
of money to distribute and substantial strains on the distribution plan as to dividing the
money according to the harms that were suffered by individuals. Again, as I mentioned,
this communitarian norm creates a desire to give some money to everybody and to give
some money even to those that have nonexistent claims or claims ofnext to zero merit,
to keep them happy. Settlement funds become a social welfare pool ofmoney as opposed
to the distribution of a judgment to each and every deserving person according to their
comparative levels of desert.
Furthermore, even after the distribution plan is defined, there are substantial
strains because people are disappointed. Some people want a little more money. Some
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wish they had worked longer at the plant. Class attorneys are less able than a judge or
special master to resist these constant strains. The point, I think, that the picture of the
judge as a neutral arbiter resolving only the claims brought by the two parties, attendant
only to the issues brought before the judge, and responsive to the procedural stature only
of a class certification have to be amended given the economic realities of class action
practice.
First, I think it's absolutely crucial that there be some review of the ultimate
substantive merit of the claim in the class certification hearing, especially if there are
substantial stakes at issue. Second, the administration ofthe class action leads to problems
that are never seen by judges. Our system ofjustice delegates the administration of the
class settlement to the class attorneys alone without judges really knowing what results.
To achieve the justice ambitions that we have for our system through the administration
ofa class, the court has to create a means ofserious supervision over the activities of the
class attorneys.
Notes
1. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jaquelin et aI., 417 U.S. 156,94 S. Ct. 2140, 40 L. Ed. 2d 732 (1974).
2. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., et aI., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
486
